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Pensions in transition in EU11 countries  
between 1990 and 2015 
 
Stefan Domonkos – András Simonovits 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper surveys the most significant problems of the pension systems of EU11 countries. 
These nations had to transform their old-age social security systems after replacing a state-
socialist economic order with a capitalist one. Stressing common as well as specific features, 
our paper concludes that no country has yet found the perfect solution, a pension policy-mix 
that would blend sustainability with efficiency and adequacy. Moreover, the countries 
surveyed do not seem to improve their policies over time. Instead, several of the errors 
discussed in the study re-appear in various forms and under various circumstances. Our study 
sheds light on the most common of these policy errors, and offers a common framework for 
evaluating pension systems along the most important qualitative dimensions. 
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Nyugdíjak az átmeneti gazdaságokban:  
EU11 1990–2015 
 
Stefan Domonkos – Simonovits András 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Cikkünk az EU11 országok nyugdíjrendszereinek legfontosabb problémáit tekinti át. Miután az 
államszocialista gazdasági rendszerüket felcserélték egy kapitalista rendszerrel, e nemzeteknek 
át kellett alakítaniuk időskori nyugdíjrendszereiket is. Egyaránt hangsúlyozva a közös és a 
sajátos vonásokat, cikkünk arra a következtetésre jut, hogy még egyik érintett ország sem 
találta meg a tökéletes megoldást, azaz egy olyan nyugdíjrendszert, amely a fenntarthatóságot 
a hatékonysággal és a megfelelőséggel ötvözné. Sőt, ezek az országok az elmúlt évtizedekben 
képtelenek voltak nyugdíjrendszereik működését javítani. Ehelyett a tanulmányban említett 
hibák időről időre különböző formában és körülmények között újra megjelentek. Vizsgálatunk 
megvilágítja ezeket a hibákat, és közös keretet ajánl a nyugdíjrendszerek minőségének 
kiértékelésére.  
 
 
Tárgyszavak: posztszocialista országok, nyugdíjreform, politikai fenntarthatóság, gazdasági 
fenntarthatóság, nyugdíjmegfelelőség, nyugdíjprivatizáció 
 
 
JEL kódok: H11, H55 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
After 1990, the nations of the former state-socialist bloc, in particular the eleven Eastern Europe-
an post-socialist nations that pursued fast integration into the European Union (EU), were con-
fronted with the formidable task of a concomitant transformation, from state-socialism to a mar-
ket economy, and from authoritarianism to political democracy. As a result, their pension sys-
tems, designed to fit a centrally planned and distorted economy, had to be adapted to new circum-
stances. Depending on a large variety of economic and political conditions and limitations, each of 
the EU11 countries had to re-think the details of their retirement policies.1 The experience of the 
region demonstrates the diversity of responses policy-makers can adopt when confronted with 
significant reform pressure. Different EU11 countries introduced a variety of reforms at different 
periods, largely depending on previous pension policy arrangements and economic and political 
tensions. Focusing on the 25 years of post-socialist reform experience in the EU11 nations, this 
study shall discuss the best and worst practices in pension policy-making, and offer a common 
framework for evaluating the quality of pension systems. 
Since the introduction of social insurance in the late 19th century, which included both health 
and retirement arrangements, most of the now EU11 countries were leaning towards the Bis-
marckian rather than the Beveridgean philosophy in their pension-policy design (Inglot, 2008). In 
most cases, the benefit amounts were, in one form or another, derived from past contributions, 
but the link between these two variables was often considerably weaker than what a defined con-
tribution (DC) or points system would require. While the pension systems of the state-socialist 
economies needed a thorough reform, they had one undeniable advantage: unlike many of the 
Western pension schemes, by the 1970s, they comprised the entire population.2 
During the Soviet-type development, these countries learned very little about the actual func-
tioning of Western European market economies. Thus, when the transition started, the politicians 
and experts of EU11 nations relied on the know-how of foreign advisors, mainly from the World 
Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and to a much lesser extent also from the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). Some challenges, such as the indexation and valorisa-
tion of pensions could be successfully tackled using advice from international policy advocates 
                                                 
1 The EU11 countries are as follows (in English alphabetical order):  Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 
2 This specific feature of state-socialist pension systems was a result of the official full-employment policy 
of the ruling communist parties. Pensions, as well as a number of other social transfers of financial and 
non-financial nature, were organized and administered under the presumption that everyone was em-
ployed (Baxandall, 1994; Eichhorst & Hemerijck, 2008). This was not anymore the case in the new mar-
ket economies in the 1990s, which also led to significant tensions. 
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from the West.3 However, specific problems of transition, such as the collapse of the state-owned 
sector, were of unprecedented nature, and needed special solutions. This study evaluates the pen-
sion-policy pathways undertaken by the former state-socialist countries in response to the chal-
lenges of economic transition and demographic ageing. Besides discussing the most visible issues 
of post-socialist pension-reform policy, we also draw the readers’ attention to the less conspicuous 
design errors in pension systems, which have not yet gained sufficient attention in the scholarly 
literature. 
What are our criteria for evaluating pension systems and their reforms (cf. Barr & Diamond, 
2008)? There is a general view that a pension system should ensure adequacy and economic sus-
tainability. If there are large groups whose members will not receive adequate pensions, ensuring 
acceptable income after they have retired, then the system is inadequate.4 If the system is econom-
ically unsustainable, it will sooner or later be corrected by subsequent reforms. 
The pension system should also be equitable within and among generations. However, equity 
does not necessarily mean that a pension system has to be actuarially fair, like the Polish and Lat-
vian notional DC (for short, NDC) schemes copied from Sweden. We expect that an equitable sys-
tem deviates from actuarial fairness in a logical way and achieves redistribution from the better 
paid to the worse paid, not vice versa. The system is intergenerationally equitable if the relative 
burden of each generation is the same.  
The pension system should combine solidarity and efficiency. Solidarity demands at least a 
minimal pension for everybody, even if somebody had not paid contribution during her entire 
adult lifetime. Efficiency demands rules which make workers interested in working and contrib-
uting to the system as much as rational. Efficiency within the pension system is of particular im-
portance in cases when the full benefit (normal) retirement age is quickly increased in a limited 
period, as it occurred in almost all EU11 countries. More specifically, if the deduction for early 
(pre-statutory) retirement is too small, then increases in the normal retirement age will not lead to 
increases in the effective retirement age. However, if the deduction is excessive, then the early 
retirees, forming a large part of the pensioners, may be pushed into poverty (see also Puur, Leppik 
& Klesment, 2015).  
 
                                                 
3 Following the continental custom, we shall distinguish the indexation of pensions in payment and of 
initial pensions throughout the text, and refer to the latter as valorisation. 
4 In addition to open adequacy, reflected by the purchasing power of the pension benefit, there is general-
ized adequacy, reflecting the additional private costs of health and old-age care. Without prejudice to the 
importance and relevance of this latter concept, our paper emphasizes open adequacy, because of its di-
rect link to the pension system and its better measurability. 
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The pension system should be stable and flexible. Stability means that the basic structure and 
the important parameter values of the pension system do not change too fast and too frequently; 
and if they change, their modification is announced in advance. Flexibility is also needed, other-
wise delayed changes may eventually lead to the adoption of large, shock-like adjustments once 
reform pressures cannot be ignored anymore. Such breaks have been common in the pension sys-
tems of the EU11 nations, causing non-negligible tensions among the public. 
Last, but not least, pension systems should be well-designed. As a rule of thumb, good design 
eans that the social security system is as simple as possible, yet not overly simplistic. For example, 
the simplest possible annual increase of pensions in progress would be a uniform absolute in-
crease, regardless of the previous benefit. However, such a policy is not only unfair and politically 
sensitive, but, as the recent Slovakian experience has shown, may also lead to unforeseen inequi-
ties between successive cohorts of pensioners. Proportional indexation and valorisation is there-
fore the general rule. Similarly, while reducing the reference period to the last few active years 
may simplify pension administration, such an approach is overly simplistic. In order to comply 
with the criterion of equity and efficiency, the entry pensions should depend in a symmetric way 
on all, not just the last contributions. 
This paper will evaluate to what extent EU11 countries followed the basic principles of sound 
pension policy-making in their pension reforms. While discussing a large variety of different re-
form episodes, special attention will be given to the privatization of old-age social security, which 
is one of the few common traits in the pension policy trajectories of the EU11 countries. Between 
1994 and 2010, there was a widespread though not unanimous agreement that the problems of the 
public pension system cannot be solved without partial funding and privatization of these state-
run systems (supporters: Holzmann, 1994; Palacios & Rocha, 1998; Chlon, Góra & Rutkowski, 
1999; critics: Beattie & McGillivray, 1995, Augusztinovics, 1999; Müller, 1999; Simonovits, 1999; 
Orszag & Stiglitz, 2001; Barr, 2001; Barr & Diamond, 2008).  
This has led to the introduction of mandatory private pension accounts coupled with a partial 
opt-out from the public pension system (for an overview, see Adascalitei & Domonkos, 2015; 
Naczyk & Domonkos, 2015). The Great Recession underlined the weaknesses of mandatory fund-
ed systems, requiring the re-evaluation of past policy choices.  
The structure of the remainder is as follows. The first part of the study discusses the adequacy 
and the sustainability of the pension systems of EU11 countries. Subsequently, the second part 
analyses the corresponding intra- and intergenerational equity problems. The third part investi-
gates the harmonization of solidarity and efficiency. The fourth part analyses the stability and the 
flexibility of the pension systems. This is followed by a discussion of the less conspicuous design 
problems in EU11 pension system in the fifth part, and detour to the case of pension privatization 
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in the sixth part of the paper. Finally, we propose a common framework for the analysis of pension 
systems, summarizing the main dimensions that should be taken into account. We also propose 
quantitative indicators measuring these properties of a country’s pension system.  
 
Adequacy and sustainability 
 
Tables 1a and 1b show the median relative income of the elderly in EU11 countries and the poverty 
rate, defined as 60 per cent of equivalised median income, among individuals aged 60 or more.5 
As can be seen, some EU11 nations have a rather low relative elderly income (e.g. the Baltics 
around 0.7). By contrast, in Hungary, Poland and Romania, elderly households have above aver-
age income. In some of the EU11 nations, the relative income of older households is reasonably 
stable over time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Note that according to the most recent Labor Force Survey data from 2012, published by the Eurostat 
(2014), the median age at which pensioners start receiving their old-age pensions remains below 60 in 
each of the EU11 nations. In Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, it reaches only 57 years.  
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Table 1. 
Median relative income of elderly (60 and older compared to cohorts aged 15-59) 
and poverty rate among the 60+ population 
Table 1a. Median relative income of elderly1 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
EU28       0.92 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.97 
BG   0.81 0.80 0.70 0.67 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.87 
CZ  0.86 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.81 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.87 
EE 0.77 0.74 0.71 0.67 0.64 0.68 0.74 0.77 0.73 0.70 0.64 
HR       0.81 0.87 0.89 0.92 0.90 
HU  1.02 0.96 0.99 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.01 0.99 1.05 1.10 
LV  0.76 0.67 0.66 0.58 0.60 0.79 0.87 0.81 0.79 0.75 
LT  0.82 0.76 0.71 0.72 0.75 0.95 0.92 0.80 0.81 0.79 
PL  1.11 1.09 1.07 0.99 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.01 
RO    0.8 0.89 0.99 1.02 1.06 1.07 1.09 1.11 
SI  0.89 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.91 
SK  0.89 0.88 0.84 0.81 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.85 0.92 0.93 
Table 1b. Elderly poverty rate2 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
EU28       15.3 15.5 14.6 14.1 14.0 
BG     18.9 22.6 30.3 34.6 28.7 27.8 25.6 
CZ  4.5 5.4 4.9 6.7 7.1 6.4 6.5 6.1 5.6 6.5 
EE 19.4 19.7 24.0 30.6 35.5 31.0 15.5 13.1 17.6 23.3 30.9 
HR       27.5 27.2 24.2 22.0 22.6 
HU  6.4 9.1 5.9 4.4 4.9 4.8 6.1 7.7 5.9 6.2 
LV  20.8 30.7 34.1 47.2 43.5 18.3 10.9 14.8 17.6 25.7 
LT  16.9 20.7 26.7 28.9 23.7 12.0 11.7 19.5 20.3 19.9 
PL  8.1 8.3 8.3 11.8 14.2 14.0 14.5 14.0 12.3 12.3 
RO    28.1 23.5 19.1 15.7 13.5 14.3 14.8 15.5 
SI  18.7 18.3 17.7 19.1 18.2 18.8 19.1 17.3 17.8 15.9 
SK  6.3 7.6 7.3 9.0 8.8 6.7 6.2 7.8 6.6 6.6 
Notes: BG=Bulgaria, CZ=Czech Republic, EE=Estonia, HR=Croatia, LV=Latvia, 
PL=Poland, RO=Romania, SI=Slovenia, SK=Slovakia;1expressed as a ratio of the me-
dian income of those aged 60 or more to the members of the 15-59 age 
group;2expressed in percentages of the relevant age group. 
Source: Eurostat [tespn060 and ilc_li02 series], retrieved on February 19, 2016. 
 
 
In Slovenia, for instance, it oscillated between 0.87 and 0.91 during the entire period observed. 
However, in countries such as Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, the indicator evolved along a much 
more turbulent path. While an in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this study, both extreme 
values and extreme oscillation may indicate important flaws within the pension system. Differ-
ences in the elderly poverty rate across time are somewhat less significant than in the case of rela-
tive elderly household income. However, cross-country differences are very large. The Czech and 
Slovak Republics have an elderly poverty rate well below ten per cent, while the minimalistic Bal-
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tic welfare states, Estonia and Latvia in particular, appear to have great difficulty addressing old-
age poverty.  
Turning to the other side of the coin, sustainability is best judged by the contribution rate or by 
the ratio of public pension expenditures to the GDP. There is a general idea that a pension-to-GDP 
ratio above 15 per cent or a contribution rate above 20–25 per cent is excessive.6 Table 2 shows 
the share of old-age, disability and survivors’ pension in the GDP. Several EU11 countries spend 
well beyond 10 percent of their GDP on pensions, although none of them reaches the 15-percent 
threshold. 7 Before making dare observations, note that in some countries the content of the cate-
gory changed from one year to the next. The drop of the share from 10.8 in 2011 to 9.3 in 2012 in 
Hungary is a case in point.8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Note that the economically illogical breakdown of the total contribution rate into employee and employer 
rates modifies even this apparently unequivocal index. In EU11, the employee’s contribution rate was 
much lower than the employer’s rate, inflating their sum with respect to another country, where the two 
rates are the same. For example, in Latvia, these rates are zero for the employee and 20 per cent for the 
employer, respectively. If we increase the underlying gross wage by 10 per cent, and work with equal 
rates of 10 and 10 per cent, then the new rates diminish to 10/1.1≈9.09 per cent and their sum is 18.18 
per cent.  
7 It is noteworthy that, as late as 2008, the Greek projection that estimated a 25-per cent pension-to-GDP 
ratio by 2060 was broadly accepted without raising much concern from the international policy-making 
community. 
8 There was a malevolent change in the Hungarian statistic from 2011 to 2012: transfers to disabled per-
sons were reclassified so that they do not fall into the category of pensions, unless the person has reached 
retirement age. In this latter case, disability benefits were reclassified as old-age pensions.  
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Table 2.  
Share of pension expenditure on GDP (in % of GDP). 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
EU28     11.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.5  
BG    7.3   7.0   6.4   6.7   8.3   8.8   8.2   8.1   8.6 
CZ   7.6   7.7   7.7   7.6   7.8   8.7   8.8   9.2   9.4   9.3 
EE   6.0   5.8   5.9  5.7   6.9   8.9   8.7   7.8   7.6   7.5 
HR       9.3 10.4 10.6 10.4 10.6 10.9 
HU   9.2   9.6   9.8 10.3 10.8 10.9 10.7 10.8   9.3   9.4 
LV   6.6   6.0   5.7   4.9   5.7   8.3 10.1   8.7   8.3   8.2 
LT   6.7   6.5   6.3   6.5   7.3   9.5   8.4   7.6   7.6   7.2 
PL 13.1 12.5 12.4 11.4 11.5 12.2 11.6 11.2 10.9  
RO   6.1   6.2   6.0   6.4   7.5   9.2   9.3   9.1   8.7   8.3 
SI 10.3 10.2 10.1   9.6   9.5 10.7 11.0 11.2 11.4 11.7 
SK   7.2   7.3   7.2   7.1   7.0   8.3   8.2   8.1   8.3   8.5 
Notes: For country abbreviations, see Notes to Table 1. 
Source: Eurostat [spr_exp_pens series], data refer to the share of early, old-age, sur-
vivors’ and disability pensions, retrieved on February 19, 2016. 
 
 
Moreover, differences in the tax treatment of pensions also hinder cross-country comparison. 
In countries such as Romania and Slovenia, pensions are taxable income. In the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, they constitute a net category. One should know the ratio of net to gross pension before 
making international comparisons. Hoping that these problems are not too important, available 
data demonstrate that the level of pension expenditure compared to the GDP is steadily rising 
throughout the region, but it still remains below the EU28 average. Croatia, Poland and Slovenia 
represent cases, where pension expenditure has already exceeded 10 per cent of the GDP. Howev-
er, other countries, especially Estonia and Latvia have very limited spending on pensions in com-
parison to the European average.  
Table 3 shows the ratio of the pension expenditures to the general government revenue across 
countries and years. It should be noted that, in several EU11 nations, pensions represent a transfer 
amounting to about a third of the government revenue. This was the case in Poland throughout 
the 2000s, but figures for Croatia, Romania and Slovenia are not far below this threshold. This 
figure has been steadily increasing in most countries, with the notable exception of Hungary, 
where the ratio of government expenditure to the GDP was always highest. 
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Table 3. 
Share of pension expenditure in general government revenue  
(in % of government revenue) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
EU28   26.4 28.8 28.8 28.4 28.5  
BG 19.4 19.7 16.7 17.3 23.3 26.3 25.6 23.9 23.4 
CZ 19.8 19.9 19.3 20.5 22.8 23.0 22.9 23.1 22.6 
EE 16.7 16.0 15.5 18.7 20.2 21.4 20.2 19.5 19.7 
HR    22.3 24.9 25.7 25.5 25.5 25.8 
HU 23.0 23.2 22.9 23.9 23.5 23.8 24.3 20.1 20.1 
LV 17.8 16.1 14.8 17.1 24.2 28.0 24.3 22.9 22.7 
LT 19.2 18.5 18.9 20.9 26.5 23.9 22.6 23.0 21.9 
PL 30.9 30.1 27.6 28.1 32.2 30.6 28.8 27.9  
RO 19.1 18.1 18.1 22.5 29.3 28.3 26.8 26.0 25.1 
SI 23.3 23.5 22.8 22.3 25.2 25.3 25.8 25.6 25.8 
SK 20.0 20.6 20.7 20.4 23.1 23.9 22.3 23.0 22.1 
Notes: For country abbreviations, see Notes to Table 1. 
Source: Eurostat [spr_exp_pens and gov_10a_main series], data retrieved on 8 
March, 2016. 
 
 
We end this part of the discussion with a repetition from the Introduction: if the system is un-
sustainable, it will be amended by subsequent reforms.9 This imperative is the underlying reason 
behind the “permanent reform” (Simonovits, 2008) of the pension system observed in several 
EU11 countries. 
 
Intra- and intergenerational equity 
 
Intragenerational equity, i.e. equity among members of the same generation, deserves attention 
both in pension financing and pension benefits. The general rule for pension financing should be 
the proportionality of payroll taxes levied on covered income.10 While this is mostly respected 
throughout the region, there are important details that elicit discussion among policy-makers. 
Such discussions revolve around social-security contribution breaks for employers who employ 
                                                 
9 For example, when Hungary applied for conditional loans from the World Bank and the IMF and the EU 
in October 2008, the government had to scrap the 13th month pensions introduced between 2002 and 
2006. 
10 Covered earnings refer to income included in the base for calculating pension benefits and contribu-
tions. Most commonly, the two are the same, even if the replacement rate of individuals with diverging 
incomes may differ. 
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disadvantaged jobseekers, as well as the treatment of very high income through setting a cap on 
the contribution base.  
A particularly high tax wedge on labour income has been argued to decrease employment, es-
pecially in nations with strong trade unions (Nickell & Layard, 1999; Daveri & Tabellini, 2000). 
Empirical evidence in line with this statement has been produced using data both from post-
socialist countries (Rutkowski & Walewski, 2009; Góra et al., 2006), as well as from other politi-
cal-economic contexts (Daveri & Tabellini, 2000; Bassanini & Duval 2006). However, the debate 
on the consequences of a high tax wedge on employment has most commonly emphasized its neg-
ative impact on low-skill workers, who appear to be harder hit by the policy than their highly edu-
cated counterparts. Policy-makers have reacted by introducing specific exemptions from social 
security contributions and income tax for low-income workers. The most prominent example of 
the recent years has been the Slovak Republic, which introduced in 2013 a social-security contri-
bution relief for employers that hire long-term unemployed for a relatively low wage. The policy, 
initially targeted at low-skilled workers has been reshaped in 2015 to better address the needs of 
the least developed geographical regions of the country.  
The treatment of very high earnings also deserves attention. To date, most EU11 countries have 
a maximum amount of covered income determined in their social security legislation. These range 
from the relatively low cap of 2.5 times the national average wage in Poland to up to five times the 
national average wage in the Slovak Republic. Estonia and Hungary (since 2013) represent excep-
tions, as there is no maximum contribution base and no maximum pension defined in the social-
security legislation (Social Security Agency, 2014).  
Intragenerational equity in pension financing requires the assessment of not only the pension 
system, but also of personal income taxation (PIT). A PIT system that is stable in the long run and 
fair is a necessary condition for intragenerational equity in social security. Each of the countries 
analysed uses payroll taxes, i.e. social security contributions, to finance pensions, but the revenue 
collected through this channel is rarely sufficient to cover pension outlays. The social-security def-
icit is therefore covered from the general budget. This means that the effective pension contribu-
tion rate of workers, especially of those who carry a higher tax burden, is higher than their social 
security contributions alone.  
Turning from pension financing to pension benefits, intragenerational equity requires the 
presence of a pension scheme that provides reasonable benefits even for workers whose contribu-
tion base was below average throughout their career. In effect, most OECD countries have a pen-
sion system where the replacement rate of low earners is somewhat higher than that of better 
earners. As Table 4 demonstrates, the EU11 constitute a very heterogeneous group in this respect. 
On the one hand, the Czech Republic has an extremely redistributive old-age pension system, 
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where past contributions have a very limited impact on the level of monthly pensions (see Potůček 
& Rudolfová, 2015).11  By contrast, Hungary represents a case, where virtually no decline in the 
replacement rate is observable for the income levels analysed. 
Data on the tax wedge, defined as the tax and social security payments levied on wage income, 
also show considerable differences. While the Czech and Slovak Republics and Slovenia are coun-
tries where the tax burden is shifted towards high-income workers, the Hungarian tax system is 
proportional.  
Table 4.  
Tax wedge and pension replacement rate of selected EU11 countries in 2014 
Table 4a. Tax wedge (income tax and social security contributions) 
 Percent of the average wage (AW) 
Comparison1 
 50 100 167 
EU28 20.8 29.6 34.7 1.67 
CZ 15.0 23.0 26.3 1.75 
EE 16.7 19.6 20.8 1.25 
HU 34.5 34.5 34.5 1.00 
PL 21.0 23.8 25.0 1.19 
SK 16.0 22.9 25.7 1.61 
SI 22.9 33.2 37.7 1.64 
Table 4b. Old-age pension replacement rate 
 Percent of the average wage (AW) 
Comparison1 
 50 100 150 
EU28 80.7 70.9 66.4 0.82 
CZ 93.1 63.8 51.9 0.56 
EE 76.1 59.8 53.5 0.70 
HU 89.6 89.6 89.6 1.00 
PL 54.0 52.8 52.4 0.97 
SK 84.0 80.6 79.4 0.95 
SI 57.6 57.4 55.1 0.96 
Notes1tax wedge and replacement rate of above average earners expressed as a multiple 
of the tax wedge and replacement rate of below-average earners. 
Source: replacement rate: OECD Pensions at a Glance dataset, tax wedge: Eurostat 
[earn_nt_taxrate series], data retrieved on 15 April, 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 The redistributive nature of the Czech public pension system was contested at the Czech constitutional 
court in 2007, which declared the low replacement rate the system provided for high-income individuals 
unconstitutional. The court’s judgment, published in 2010, was followed by a minor reform of the system 
slightly decreasing its redistributiveness (Potůček & Rudolfová, 2015).   
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Although lower replacement rates or a higher tax wedge for better earning workers may dis-
suade some tax payers from contributing to the social security system, there are strong arguments 
in favour of these policies. Income-related divergence in life expectancy is one of the most im-
portant among them. Intragenerational (in)equity is often present in the form of large differences 
in life expectancy and disutility of labour among low and high earners. There is growing evidence, 
both in Western and Eastern Europe, that longer-lived workers self-select into delayed retirement, 
whereas shorter-lived individuals opt more often for early retirement (Kühntopf, 2010; Kühntopf 
& Tivig, 2014; Simonovits; 2015). A pension system relying solely on standard actuarial adjust-
ments and mortality tables generated by national statistical agencies cannot account for such be-
haviour among workers close to retirement.  
Given the significant degree of uncertainty about the future, assessing intergenerational equity 
is in many ways even more challenging than evaluating intragenerational equity. Generational 
Accounting (GA), a method developed by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1992, 1994), which 
tries to quantify burden-sharing among generations, might be particularly useful in determining if 
a pension system complies with the principle of intergenerational equity. Notwithstanding its 
shortcomings, GA can provide a meaningful yet by no means entirely precise picture about inter-
generational redistribution within various pension systems. Due to its forward-looking nature 
(Auerbach, Gokhale & Kotlikoff 1992), its most important application lies in capturing the effect of 
reforms in public policies on the net burden of future generations. For the first time, GA in EU11 
was developed by Gál, Simonovits and Tarcali (2000), who applied the method to the case of the 
Hungarian pension system. 
Probably the simplest possible way of ensuring intergenerational pension equity is to fix the 
contribution rate for a long period and define the pension benefits through an NDC system that 
carries out an automatic actuarial adjustment of pensions payable to the development of the aver-
age life expectancy. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, such a system provides considerable 
space for perverse redistribution due to life-expectancy differences across various occupational 
and income groups.  
Another unwanted effect of having an NDC scheme is that replacement rates are projected to 
decrease dramatically as the population becomes older. This trend is expected to reach extreme 
levels in the case of Poland. In their comparative analysis of Europe’s NDC schemes, Chłoń-
Domińczak et al. (2012) expect an eventual decline of the ratio of the average Polish pension to the 
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average wage from 56 percent in 2007 to 26 percent in 2060.12 As Table 5 demonstrates, a de-
crease of this magnitude in the replacement rate is unusually large, even in comparison to most 
other nations running an NDC scheme. Clearly, the Polish public NDC system falls into the trap of 
sacrificing adequacy for economic sustainability. It is likely that the implementation of such a 
strict NDC scheme will run into political difficulties in the long-run. 
As Jabłonowski, Müller and Raffelhüschen (2010) discuss, the introduction of DC schemes into 
the Polish and the Latvian pension systems will most likely lead to a significant realignment of the 
intergenerational burden, from the shoulders of cohorts yet to be born to those already living. 
However, this is reached largely at the cost pension adequacy. The main channel through which 
an NDC system achieves the goal of easing the pressure on future generations is gradual cuts in 
the pensions of the current generation. 
Table 5.  
Gross replacement rate projections: NDC schemes in the EU28 
 2013 2060 
Italy 59.9 51.8 
Latvia1 33.4 18.1 
Poland1 53.0 28.7 
Sweden1 35.6 29.0 
Note: The numbers refer to gross replacement rates given in percentages derived from the base-
line scenario of economic forecasts of the EU Ageing Report 2015; 1public pensions. 
Source: European Commission (2015). 
 
Solidarity and efficiency 
 
We end this part of the discussion with a repetition from the Introduction: if the system is unsus-
tainable, it will be amended by subsequent reforms.13 This imperative is the underlying reason 
behind the “permanent reform” (Simonovits, 2008) of the pension system observed in several 
EU11 countries. 
A system respects the principle of solidarity if it pays attention to the interests of the poorer 
strata of the population. By contrast, the principle of efficiency requires that a system achieve 
conditional optimum. A good pension scheme should combine solidarity and efficiency, as much 
as possible. While a more redistributive pension system contributes to fulfilling the moral impera-
                                                 
12 Note that, in contrast to the Polish case, Sweden softens the hardness of its NDC system by generous 
pension credit. 
13 For example, when Hungary applied for conditional loans from the World Bank and the IMF and the EU 
in October 2008, the government had to scrap the 13th month pensions introduced between 2002 and 
2006. 
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tive of solidarity, it may also engender contribution evasion and withdrawal from the labour mar-
ket. If it pays too much attention to efficiency, it may create mass poverty in old age.14  
Creating a balance between solidarity and efficiency is particularly important at a time when 
the main emphasis is put on retaining elderly workers in the labour market, either through in-
creasing the statutory retirement age or other measures. Almost every EU11 country allows work-
ers to retire earlier or later than the statutory retirement age.15 Nevertheless, earlier retirement 
normally results in a malus, while late retirement is remunerated by a bonus. In most cases, dif-
ferences between adjustments for early and deferred retirement are rather limited and remain 
close to the actuarially fair level. For instance, in the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, a person’s 
standard pension is cut by 0.5 per cent for a month of pre-statutory retirement, and is increased 
by 0.5 per cent for a month of post-statutory retirement. However, some nations motivate post-
statutory retirement by raising retirement benefits more than the actuarially fair increase. For 
example, in Estonia, a person earns a 0.9-per cent increase of her standard pension for each 
month worked beyond the statutory retirement age, but a month of pre-statutory retirement leads 
to a cut of 0.4 per cent in one’s pension.  
At first approximation, an NDC scheme is a perfect solution also in this respect. Any extra year 
increases the workers’ nonfinancial pension wealth and decreases the number of years for which 
the wealth is to be distributed, thus resulting in increased monthly pension instalments, based on 
actuarial formulae. But at a second approximation, things are more complex. Late retirement and 
high income are associated with high life expectancy. Therefore, a typical NDC scheme, just as any 
scheme relying on uniform mortality tables, oversubsidizes the well-to-do, healthy part of the 
population. The total elimination of this inequity is possible, but at a very high cost. 
As already mentioned, there is a widespread analytical bias concerning the proportionality of 
annual versus lifetime flows. When discussing redistribution, most analyses concentrate on the 
amounts of annual benefits. Lifetime income flows are largely ignored. For example, the Polish 
pension system is near proportional in annual terms. However, if we take into account that the 
higher one earns, the longer she lives, lifetime proportionality disappears. In fact, because of dif-
ferences in longevity, the lifetime return on one monetary unit of social security contribution will 
be greater among well-to-do workers than the lower paid ones.  
                                                 
14 It appears that redistribution within the pension system is not the only factor influencing public willing-
ness to comply with social security laws. Despite its very redistributive retirement system, the Czech Re-
public does not seem to suffer from tax and contribution evasion more than its counterparts in the EU11. 
15 By contrast, since 2011, females in Hungary serving for at least 40 years can retire at any age with full 
benefits; but since 2012 males with arbitrary long service and females with shorter than 40 years, cannot 
retire below normal retirement age. Introducing this type of rigidity into the pension system will almost 
inevitably backfire. 
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In a paradoxical way, the importance of this heterogeneity is stressed when evaluating progres-
sive public pension systems. Progressive systems provide proportionally lower monthly benefits to 
those who contribute more in an average month during a limited period of their careers. The crit-
ics of such systems (e.g. World Bank, 1994, p. 131)  and their defenders (e.g. Orszag & Stiglitz, 
2001) equally emphasize that ‘there [is] little [lifetime] redistribution from the rich to the poor, 
despite progressive benefit formulas,... because [they are] earnings-related ... [and]... upper-
income people enter the labour force later in life and live longer after retirement.’ To see the inde-
pendence of proportionality between contributions and benefits and fairness, note that in some 
countries (e.g. Germany), proportionality and weak actuarial adjustment coexisted, while in other 
nations (e.g. the US and the Czech Republic), progressivity and strong actuarial adjustments coex-
ist. 
 
Stability and flexibility 
 
A well-designed pension system is both stable and flexible to some extent. If a system is stable, it 
is easy to adapt to it. Stability and reliability are of particular importance in countries where trust 
in the state and in the pension system was undermined by frequent haphazard historical changes 
in the past. If a system is flexible, it can be changed in a smooth way, avoiding ruptures. It is a 
much more difficult problem to determine when stability degrades into rigidity and flexibility de-
generates into erratic governing.  
We give only one concrete example for rigidity and another one for erratic government, respec-
tively. Hungary’s attempt to harmonize the functioning of its public and private pillars is a perfect 
example for rigidity. The country introduced its mixed pension system in 1998, with the possibility 
of partial opt-out from the public pension system into a fully-funded defined-contribution 
scheme, where future pensions would depend on the amount of accumulated pension wealth and 
life expectancy. If the public pillar had remained strongly progressive, only the higher paid would 
have entered the private pillar during the voluntary entry period (1998 and 1999). To avoid this 
segregation, the public pillar was to be transformed into a DC system, just as the private pillar. But 
a 15-year-long transitory period was planned for the changes in the public pillar, until the private 
pillar starts paying indexed life annuities. The most conspicuous part of this transition was the 
gradual elimination of a complex 10-part progressive benefit formula.16 The positive feature of this 
smooth transition was that there were no notch babies, but the process preserved an unnecessary 
system for too long. When the progressive formula of the public scheme was meant to finally be-
                                                 
16 Note that in the US, three brackets (with 90, 32 and 15 per cent replacement) are sufficient. 
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come proportional, the private pillar was already closed down. Eventually, two brackets with 10 
and 20 percent deduction remained. 
The second example concerns the Slovakian ‘public economic revolution’. In 2003, the old, al-
most flat-rate pension system was suddenly transformed into a proportional points system, which 
became fully functional from January 2004 (Lesay, 2006).17 Despite the large shift in the calcula-
tion of pensions, there was no transitional period. This led to very significant differences between 
the pre-2004 cohorts of pensioners and those retiring from 2004 onwards. Imagine the fate of two 
twins; the first could retire at the end of 2003 but the second only at the beginning of 2004. If 
they were low paid, the early retiree gained; if they were highly paid, the late retiree gained. A sim-
ilar abrupt change affected the regulation of widows’ pensions: depending on the year of death, 
spouses of the deceived would qualify for a widows’ pension or not, creating extreme differences 
across identical cases of benefit claimants.  
Is it possible to design a system that incorporates the necessary set of checks and balances, al-
lowing stability and flexibility to prevail where needed? The answer to this question is complicated 
and depends not only on the economic conditions of a country, but also on politics. Pivotal pa-
rameter values of the pension system may be set up in a constitutional law, if the political situa-
tion allows its adoption. Under these circumstances, changes would still be possible, but only at 
the presence of a broader consensus. Whether such a reform is politically feasible, depends on the 
specific political and economic circumstances of a given country. 
 
Design errors in valorisation and indexation 
 
Since the publication of Avoiding the old-age crisis, a provocative World Bank (1994) study on 
ageing and pension reforms, a large body of scholarly work has studied the big and visible prob-
lems of various pension systems. Should the system be public or private? Should the public pen-
sion benefits be proportional to earnings, flat, or something in between? And, if a system is to be-
come earnings related, should there be a link to lifetime earnings, or earnings in a more limited 
time period? Should the system be comprehensive or fragmented? 
Relatively few studies have analysed smaller and less visible, though still relevant problems of 
private and public systems. We call these design errors. However, what is an error to one observer 
may be an achievement for another. To avoid this trap, following Simonovits (2014), we consider 
an error any measure which is inconsistent and unsustainable in the long run, regardless whether 
the measure is supported by the observer.  
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We confine our attention to the most important design errors in public systems in countries in 
transition.18 These errors are often linked to rules concerning the details of increases in pensions, 
which are in many cases very complicated, and their exact consequences remain unforeseeable for 
the layman. Thus, they provide an ideal tool for obfuscating austerity policies (see Pierson, 1994).  
We shall consider the indexation pensions, setting the contribution rate and the cap on covered 
earnings. Recall that in an inflationary world, unindexed pensions quickly lose their purchasing 
power. Therefore most modern public systems are indexed according to wages or prices, or their 
averages. The contribution rate should be high enough to ensure consumption smoothing and low 
enough to preserve sustainability. Its break up into the employee and the employer parts on the 
one hand and between public and private pillars on the other hand also requires care (see footnote 
6 above). The cap on the contribution base should be high enough to replace the lost income of the 
lower paid workers and low enough to constrain excessively high pensions (cf. Valdés-Prieto & 
Schwarzhaupt, 2011 and Simonovits, 2015).  
To be more concrete, we mention several serious design errors occurring in various countries. 
As Barr and Diamond (2008) emphasized, these errors were also widespread in market econo-
mies. First, errors in adjusting (mostly indexing) pensions in payment have been very common 
across the region, Hungary being one of the most illuminating examples for such practices: (a) 
changing the technique of indexation in 1996 and 1999 back-and-forth, the Hungarian pensioners 
lost to the workers;19 (b) by overestimating the consumer price index, the Hungarian government 
raised pensions in payment by 8 percent above the balanced level just in three years, between 
2013 and 2015.  
Bulgaria and Romania represent even more extreme cases, as indexation rules have often been 
disregarded by the incumbent, who passed pension raises and cuts by government decrees, lead-
ing to significant and largely unpredictable changes in pensioners’ income. As Adascalitei (2015) 
reports, the replacement rates of Bulgarian pensions oscillated between 28 and 43 per cent of net 
pre-retirement income throughout the 1990s, which led to an erosion of trust in the social security 
system. However, the practice of arbitrary indexation continued well into the late 2000s in the 
two countries. For instance, the centre-right Justice and Truth Alliance, increased Romanian pen-
sion benefits by more than sixty per cent in 2008. Yet, in sharp contrast to this practice, the so-
cial-democratic government of the early 2000s decided to apply different indexation rules to dif-
                                                                                                                                                              
17 In a flat-rate pension system, it is the number of contributive years that plays the greatest role in deter-
mining the size of future pensions. The level of contributions paid by the workers plays no role. 
18 A similar study has assessed the failed 2011 Spanish pension reform using the balanced Swedish system 
as a benchmark (Vidal-Meliá, 2013). Lovell (2009) discussed the design errors of the otherwise well-
designed US Social Security System. 
19 For a similar example, see Lovell’s (2009) study on the ‘one-year lag’ in the United States. 
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ferent cohorts of Romanian retirees, arguably with the intention of maintaining the continuity of 
rules (Adascalitei, 2015). 
Second, the design problems of initial pensions also deserve discussion. Issues related to the 
calculation of initial pensions have many dimensions: (a) due to the originally short reference 
period, in most of the EU11 countries only the last few years’ earnings were taken into account 
when calculating the initial benefits, which favoured those with a steep rise in their wage curve; 
(b) the relatively high cap on the contribution base, or even a lack thereof, causes tensions, espe-
cially if such a policy is combined with proportional pension benefits. Thus, very high earners, 
most commonly with above average longevity, will receive very high benefits once they retire; (c) 
improper valorisation, which occurs when the calculation of the lifetime average earnings ne-
glects the wage increases of the latest years, but makes the initial benefits oversensitive to wage 
and  price changes in the closing year; (d) clumsy progressivity, which refers to excessively com-
plicated and often inconsistent ways of calculating the reference wage from average lifetime earn-
ings. A good example to illustrate this point is the Czech public pension system. The old-age pen-
sion benefit is composed of a flat transfer of approximately 90 euros per month and an earnings 
related component, which is calculated in a complicated way from workers’ assessment base, us-
ing four income brackets. The first 420 euros of the assessment base are taken fully into account, 
while earnings exceeding this level are weighted downward (Social Security Agency, 2014).  
The afore-mentioned issues with indexation of pensions in payment and valorisation of starting 
pensions may also lead to inequities among subsequent cohorts of pensioners. As was already 
mentioned, in the Slovak Republic, pensions in payment have been increased by a uniform 
amount since 2012, mostly depending on inflation. By contrast, future pension claims have been 
valorised in a more proportional way, and depending on the average wage. Such differences in the 
details of indexation and valorisation lead to inequities among subsequent cohorts of retirees. 
This example illustrates that intertemporal stability requires that policy-makers pay attention to 
the interplay between the rules governing indexation and valorisation. 
Finally, as already implied, poor design is often closely linked to the excessively complicated 
nature of certain aspects of the social security legislation. Even in a well-designed pension system, 
workers may be poorly informed about their rights and responsibilities. However, if the system is 
reasonably designed, such inattention can be understood as irrational inattention, an error com-
mitted by the individual. By contrast, inattention to the features of a poorly designed system, 
whose guiding rules and principles are haphazard and will likely change in a haphazard way, is 
rational. In other words, there is not much use in devoting attention to the features of the pension 
system, thus citizens’ decision to remain uninformed is reasonable. Yet, in the more distant future, 
such inattention may lead to hardship in individual cases. 
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Privatization and renationalization 
 
The late 1990s and early 2000s were a period of significant shifts in pension policy in Eastern Eu-
rope. For a number of reasons, not least because of the support the World Bank showed for this 
reform, the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe enthusiastically embraced the multi-pillar 
pension system.20 The basic idea was simple and straightforward for the citizens and the policy 
makers of countries in transition: everything public is inefficient; therefore it should be privatized. 
Indeed, privatization was very successful in the competitive sector, but less so in the transfer sys-
tems. 
Confining our attention to the pension system, there were two basic errors in the privatization 
plans. First, the efficiency of the private system was overestimated, especially with respect to rea-
sonably designed public systems, such as the Polish NDC scheme. Second, the transition costs, 
which are equal to the amount of contributions directed from the public system to the private one, 
were significantly underestimated (Augusztinovics et al. (2002) on Hungary; Fultz (2002) on sev-
eral post-socialist countries). 
There were early critics (e.g. Beattie & McGillivray, 1995 Simonovits, 1999 and Orszag & 
Stiglitz, 2001) who warned of the pitfalls of the so-called paradigmatic reforms, but in most of the 
foregoing countries, privatization still took place. Hungary and Poland were the pioneers, who 
adopted their multi-pillar legislation as early as 1997 and 1998, respectively. Romania and the 
Czech Republic ended the reform wave, implementing their versions of the reform package in 
2008 and 2013, respectively.21 Slovenia remains the only exception that hitherto avoided the in-
troduction of a private scheme aiming to replace the public system for the general population. 
When the era of cheap debt financing ended in 2008, and strong fiscal anti-cyclic measures be-
came inevitable to prevent a free fall, the issue of transition costs became pressing. Various at-
tempts at resolving the apparent contradiction between the Growth and Stability Pact and the 
transition costs backfired. As a consequence, most of the second-pillar EU11 countries suspended 
or drastically reduced the contribution rate to the private scheme and redirected the difference to 
the public, first pillar. Some EU11 nations went even further. First, Hungary almost fully, then 
Poland in large part renationalized the private pillar. Poland also limited the options of pension 
                                                 
20 While private pension provision is acquiring an ever more important role in Western Europe as well 
(Ebbinghaus, 2015), this is not done through explicitly replacing public schemes, but rather through 
promoting private schemes supplementary to existing public ones. 
21 It should be noted, that, in comparison to earlier reformers, the Romanian, but especially the Czech 
reform created a rather moderate private scheme (Adascalitei & Domonkos, 2015).  
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fund allocation, by prohibiting the purchase of Polish state bonds (Naczyk & Domonkos, 2016). It 
is an open question in what form the second pillar will survive in the remaining countries (Draho-
koupil & Domonkos 2012, Casey, 2014, see also Ebbinghaus, 2015).  
As can be seen in Table 6, the reform trajectories undertaken by the countries of the region 
have been rather divergent. Nevertheless, almost all nations that introduced a second pillar into 
their pension system before 2008 had to re-evaluate the policy once debt financing for sovereigns 
became less available. In several cases a significant decline in the weight of the private pension 
scheme was legislated. 
The Hungarian renationalization set a very bad example (Simonovits, 2011). Rather than ex-
plaining the real problem with debt-financed (partial) privatization of the pension system, namely 
that it does not reduce the actual public involvement in old-age pension provision, the conserva-
tive Fidesz government abolished the scheme within three months. Though the ex-members re-
ceived full compensation, ordinary people started to fear irrationally that in a next step, their bank 
savings in foreign currency will be similarly raided. From the macroeconomic point of view, the 
nationalized assets, which amounted to about 9 percent of the GDP, were used to finance a con-
troversial personal tax rate reform and to buy assets. The closing of the second pillar did not lead 
to a corresponding reduction in the explicit government debt.  
However, there are countries that kept the initial reform path in pension privatization. Bulgaria 
and Croatia have been the only Eastern European EU member states that, as of 2015, have not 
introduced changes curtailing the second pillar. Romania represents a third case: even though the 
increase in second-pillar contributions between 2008–2015 has been slower than initially 
planned, the private system remained largely functional. Similarly, Estonia curtailed its second 
pillar in 2008–2010, but has later reintroduced second-pillar contribution rates at the initial level. 
Nevertheless, political debate about re-addressing the second-pillar legislation is on the agenda in 
several of these countries (Guardiancich, 2013, Adascalitei & Domonkos, 2015) 
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Table 6.  
Basic characteristics of second pillar pensions in EU11 nations 
Country 
Initial reform 
implementation 
Old-age social security contribu-
tion rate / 2nd pillar contribu-
tions upon reform introduction 
(% of gross wage) 
Average annual 2nd  
pillar contributions, 
2002-2010 (% GDP)2 
Main post-2008 reforms 
Bulgaria 2002 231 (ee: 8.05, er: 14.95, scr: 20) / 
5 
0.7 - 
Croatia 2002 20 (ee: 20, scr: 20) / 5 1.3 - 
Czech 
Republic 
2013 281 (ee: 6.5, er: 21.5, scr: 23,05),  
20 old-age / 3 + 2 by saver 
- 2nd pillar shut down on 1 January, 2016. Pension 
wealth accumulated up to 2016 will be transferred 
to individual bank accounts or to accounts other 
pension savings schemes. 
Estonia 2002 20 (er: 20, scr: 16.67) / 4 + 2 by 
saver 
0.6 2009-2011: Temporary suspension of 2nd pillar 
contributions, return to 4 + 2 percentage points 
(p.p.) model from 2012 onwards. 
Hungary 1998 33.51 (ee: 9.5, er: 24, scr: 27.02) /  
6 gradually increasing to 8 
1.1 2010-2011: Complete reversal of the second pillar, 
including quasi-nationalization of accumulated 
pension wealth. 
Latvia 2001 20 (ee: 0,er:20, scr: 16.67 ) /  
2 gradually increasing to 8 
0.8 2009: Decrease of 2nd pillar contributions from 8 
p.p. to 2 p.p.; Return to a contribution rate of 6 
p.p. by 2016.  
Lithuania 2004 25.91 (ee:2.5, er: 23.4, scr: 20.99) 
/ 2.5 gradually increasing to 5.5 
0.6 2009, 2012: Decrease of the 2nd pillar contribution 
rate to 2 p.p. in 2009, further decrease to 1.5 p.p. 
in 2012. Increase planned in the future. 
Poland 1999 19.52 (ee: 9.76, er: 9.76, scr: 
17.78) / 7.3 
1.4 2011: 2nd pillar contributions decrease to 2.3 p.p. 
with a plan to gradually increase them to 3.5 p.p.; 
2013: 2nd pillar contributions frozen at 2.92 p.p., 
approx. 50% of pension wealth (part allocated into 
Polish state securities) seized and future alloca-
tions into Polish state securities banned. 
Romania 2008 27.51 (ee: 9.5, er: 18, scr: 23.31) / 
2, gradually increasing to 6 
0.7 2009: Delay in the planned increases in the 2nd 
pillar contribution rates. Increases resumed in 
2010. 
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Slovakia 2005 18 (ee:4, er:14, scr: 15.79) / 9 1.0 2007-2015: Opening several times the 2nd pillar for 
entry and leaving; 2008: abolishing mandatory 2nd 
pillar membership; 2012: Limiting 2nd pillar con-
tributions to 4 p.p. of gross wage with a plan to 
gradually increase contributions to 6 p.p. 
Notes: ee=employee contributions, er=employers’ contributions, scr=standardized contribution rate (for calculation, see footnote 
6);1includes contributions for old-age, disability and survivors’ pensions.  
Sources: Adascalitei & Domonkos (2015), Holzmann & Guven (2009), Naczyk & Domonkos (2016), Volskis (2012), 2approximate val-
ues based on Price & Rudolph (2013, 46). 
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A framework for evaluating pension systems 
 
The earlier discussion has demonstrated the importance of evaluating pension reforms along mul-
tiple dimensions. The introduction of mandatory funded schemes is probably the best reform at-
tempt for the illustration of this point.  
Table 7.  
A common framework for evaluating the performance of pension systems 
Dimension Indicator Source1 
Adequacy Median relative income of 
elderly households  
Eurostat [tespn060] 
Poverty rate of the elderly Eurostat [ilc_li02] 
Sustainability Share of pension expenditure 
on GDP 
Eurostat [spr_exp_pens] 
Share of pension expenditure 
on general government reve-
nue 
Eurostat [spr_exp_pens and 
gov_10a_main] 
Intragenerational equity and 
solidarity 
Pension replacement rates at 
various income levels  
OECD Pensions at a glance, net 
replacement rate  
Tax wedge at various income 
levels 
Eurostat [earn_nt_taxrate] 
Lifetime pension flows for 
individuals with differing 
income levels 
Internationally comparable data 
are not available. Data can be de-
rived if the average replacement 
rate and longevity of various in-
come groups is known. 
Intergenerational equity Net tax profile of generations 
to be born 
Internationally comparable data 
are not available. Data can be de-
rived from detailed fiscal data us-
ing GA. 
Efficiency2 ̶ ̶ 
Flexibility The presence and limits of 
early/late retirement and 
length of service period need-
ed 
OECD Pensions at a glance 
Punishment for early and late 
retirement 
OECD Pensions at a glance  
Notes:1brackets include Eurostat series identificators; 2pension-system efficiency cannot be di-
rectly calculated. A pension system is considered efficient if it achieves the dual objective of in-
come replacement and poverty alleviation, without interfering excessively with the economy. 
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Those who promoted the introduction of the second pillars paid very little attention to the di-
mensions of inter- and intragenerational equity, solidarity, and fiscal sustainability in the middle-
run. By contrast, the expectation of large gains in efficiency through privatization dominated the 
policy discourse. Taking this into account, the reform reversals that took place after 2008 are ra-
ther unsurprising. Table 7 summarizes our recommendation for a comprehensive framework for 
analysing pension systems, and provides sources for data and indicators that may be used for 
evaluating pension policies along the dimensions identified. 
The degree of adequacy of national pension systems can be internationally compared using da-
ta on the relative income of elderly households and statistics on elderly poverty. Statistics on the 
ratios of pension expenditure to the GDP and to budget revenue lend themselves to a meaningful 
and internationally comparable sustainability analysis the pension system. Intragenerational eq-
uity and solidarity can also be measured using OECD statistics on pension replacement rates for 
various income levels, in combination with an analysis of the tax wedge. Nevertheless, data on the 
net pension replacement rate for specific income groups are only available for a limited number of 
EU11 nations. Flexibility is a rather elusive concept, the measurement of which is possible only to 
a limited extent. However, the presence of variable retirement and the concomitant absence of a 
requirement for an excessively long minimum service period are good indicators of flexibility in 
pension provision. The lowest pensionable age and the level of actuarial adjustments for early and 
late retirement may also help in evaluating the flexibility of a pension scheme.  
 
Conclusions 
 
EU11 countries differed considerably in how successfully they managed to reform their economies 
in general and their pension system in particular after 1989. Some of them, like Poland and Slo-
vakia, did rather well. Other countries, like Hungary and Slovenia were less successful. However, 
most countries have created pension systems that are in acute need for further reform. The fore-
going countries executed similar pension policies in large part, but they diverged in details.  
Having taken a closer look at the pension policies across the EU11, we have identified some of sim-
ilarities and common lessons that should be learned from more than twenty years of post-socialist 
pension reforms. Adequacy and sustainability are closely linked. A pension system can be gener-
ous, but if it is unsustainable, it will have to be sooner or later downsized. A pension system can be 
sustainable, but if it is not adequate, voters will demand its replacement, and most likely succeed 
in the long run.  
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Pension system design should always observe the imperative of intra- and intergenerational 
fairness. It is important that the pension system, which concerns an average citizen for several 
decades should be accepted as fair at any given year by the then living population. It should com-
bine solidarity and efficiency, as well as stability and flexibility. Pension schemes, which most 
commonly constitute an intergenerational contract, should display a reasonable degree of stability 
and predictability. They should not be amended as frequently as the regulation of taxation. How-
ever, if the system becomes overly rigid, it will almost inevitably be unsustainable.  
Partial privatization and prefunding of the unfunded public pension system seemed to be a 
good idea twenty years ago, but the reform did not deliver its big promises. It is small wonder that 
at the first occasion when the financing of sovereign debt became difficult, a number of countries 
partly or fully nationalized their private pension funds. However, observing the recent pension-
policy debate, it should also be noted that many experts overemphasize the importance of the big 
questions, such as the partial privatization of public pensions, and pay little or no attention to the 
subtler design errors of the policies. Practice shows that the latter can be as important or even 
more important than the former. 
While statistics allowing a comparison of pension system adequacy and sustainability across 
countries are available, indices of intra- and intergenerational fairness, as well as policy stability 
are missing. Post-socialist pension reforms and their failures clearly demonstrate the need for 
such indicators. 
If the governments of EU11 countries have paid more attention to the problems above, they 
could have more stable, more efficient and more equitable pension systems. While not all errors 
are inevitable, several of those discussed in this article, such as the creation of notch cohorts, 
could have been avoided. In any case, the political and technocratic elites of post-socialist Europe 
have accumulated enough experience with pension reforms by now. Accumulating the critical 
mass of political will to learn from past mistakes should follow suit. 
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